UDC 517.9

New equilibria for games with lateral interests of participants

/ E.R. Smol’yakov // Kibernetika i sistemnyi analiz. — 2016. — Vol. 52, N 4. — P. 29–42.

The author proposes advanced concepts of equilibrium for static and dynamic conflict problems described by differential equations. The problems are considered both on the game set common for all the participants and on partially intersecting game sets. These concepts are useful to search for the strongest equilibrium in any problems and to find a fair sharing of co-operative income. Fig.: 3. Tabl.: 0. Refs: 17 titles.

Keywords:

games on intersected sets, complex equilibria.


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Author(s):

Смольяков Эдуард Римович, доктор физ.-мат. наук, профессор Московского государственного университета им. М.В. Ломоносова, Россия,
e-mail: ser-math@rambler.ru