УДК 519.8

В.М. ГОРБАЧУК,
Інститут кібернетики ім. В.М. Глушкова НАН України, Київ, Україна,
 GorbachukVasyl@netscape.net

В.А. ЗАСЛАВСЬКИЙ,
Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка, Київ, Україна,
 Zas.Vlad@gmail.com

П.С. КНОПОВ,
Інститут кібернетики ім. В.М. Глушкова НАН України, Київ, Україна,
 Knopov1@yahoo.com

ВПЛИВ ТЕХНОЛОГІЙ ТА ФАКТОРІВ КОНФЛІКТУ
НА РІВНОВАЖНІ СТАНИ

СПИСОК ЛІТЕРАТУРИ

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