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Cybernetics And Systems Analysis
International Theoretical Science Journal
Volume 58 >>> № 6 NOVEMBER — DECEMBER 2022
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UDC 519.8
V. Gorbachuk1, V. Zaslavskyi2, P. Knopov3


1 V.M. Glushkov Institute of Cybernetics, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine

 GorbachukVasyl@netscape.net

2 Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine

 Zas.Vlad@gmail.com

3 V.M. Glushkov Institute of Cybernetics, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine

 Knopov1@yahoo.com

IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGIES AND CONFLICT FACTORS ON EQUILIBRIUM STATES

Abstract. The possibilities of applying models and methods of decision-making theory and game theory to solve problems that arise in the analysis of various conflicts and their consequences are considered. The sources of conflicts between the parties in the economic and social spheres, military confrontations, and problems of distribution of limited resources are analyzed. When generating political decisions and actions, decisions and proposals of the parties are aggregated in order to form balanced versions of decisions in the conflicts. Considerable attention is paid to the analysis of strategies for ensuring peace and deterring wars in conflicts.

Keywords: advantages, perceptions, potential settlement region, Cobb–Douglas production function, efforts at productive enterprises and military actions, Cournot reaction curves.


FULL TEXT

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